Analecto

21 de janeiro de 2019

What I learned reading “Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and for a Phenomenological Philosophy”.

Filed under: Livros — Tags:, — Yurinho @ 15:54

Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and for a Phenomenological Philosophy” was written by Edmund Husserl. Below, what I learned reading his text.

  1. Natural knowledge is experimental.
  2. Thus, natural knowledge is limited by the world and is useful in the world, which is the field of experience.
  3. Natural knowledge, if it is experimental, is sensitive and present: it is not about anticipations or about memories, nor about what we do not feel in ourselves, but about here and now, or what could be here and now.
  4. It is possible to observe what is experienced by others, but only in a metaphorical sense: it is not that we observe what they feel, but we observe how they externalize their feelings, since we can observe their actions.
  5. Figuring out a person’s feelings by observing their actions isn’t an “originally given” knowledge, because you are speculating about their feelings by observing something that isn’t the feeling itself.
  6. The world as object of study is the stage of all the phenomena that can be theorized about.
  7. This world as an object of study is what the natural sciences are concerned with.
  8. This is not to say that the humanities shouldn’t be concerned with this world.
  9. Empirical science studies the fact.
  10. Fact = here and now.
  11. If something happened before, but doesn’t happen now, it was a fact and it can still be studied.
  12. It is through the study of facts and their relationships that we can create “laws” that anticipate phenomena.
  13. That’s because facts tend to repeat themselves, given a set of conditions that could originate them.
  14. Each fact has essential (primary) and secondary predicates.
  15. What is common in all sounds is the essence of sound, but other characteristics that may exist with the sound are ” accidental “.
  16. It is through these characteristics that we categorize the facts.
  17. The essence is that characteristic that makes something cease to belong in a certain concept if such characteristic is removed: sound if vibration of air, só, if there’s no air, there’s no sound, which makes air essential to the sound.
  18. Ideation (“visualization” of essence) is not an empirical activity.
  19. Pure essence is not concrete, but it is related to the concrete.
  20. Empirical study looks at one side of the thing at a time.
  21. There is always something in the object of study that escapes us.
  22. If something is logical, that is, if a concept contains possible characteristics in itself, it is something that can be studied and perhaps we will find it in the real world someday.
  23. The fact that something is visible does not guarantee that we can understand it.
  24. Personal intuition without ideation is not possible.
  25. It is possible to “extract” the essence of something without the concrete fact (here and now), by bringing the memory of the fact to mind and reasoning about it in a mental experiment.
  26. Then it is possible to reason about something that was not experienced by the person who is reasoning.
  27. The enunciation of the facts requires empirical data.
  28. Reasoning about essences requires apprehension of the essence.
  29. When you work with pure geometry, you do not think about that cone, about that circle or that cube, but about the general rules about the cone, circle, or cube, which cover cones, circles, and cubes in general.
  30. Eidetic generality is like pure geometry: it is generality unconditioned to particular things (kinda like an axiom, but not exactly an axiom).
  31. An eidetic generality can be applied to concrete cases (as laws of nature can be applied to particular phenomena).
  32. Eidetic generality is not exactly like natural laws, because natural laws always presuppose the existence of something, whereas eidetic generality does not necessarily suppose that the object to which the concept refers actually exists (it’s “theorized” about).
  33. Each essence has a number of possible factual singularizations (a concept may or may not correspond to reality, sometimes in more than one form), so that there is co-operation between science of facts (practical, empirical) and science of essences (theoretical, conceptual).
  34. Examples of science of essences are pure mathematics, pure logic, among other abstract sciences whose objects may or may not factually exist (remembering that fact is here and now).
  35. The science of the essence can work without concrete object, but the sciences of fact (the natural ones) can not work without concrete object.
  36. Thus, science of fact and experimental science are equivalent terms.
  37. The first science of essence was modern mathematics.
  38. Thus it can be said that empirical science does not contribute to the science of essence, because factual science is only concerned with facts, and the science of essence, as something conceptual, is indifferent to facts.
  39. On the other hand, empirical science depends on concepts (“pure sciences”).
  40. For example: formal logic is eidetic and does not need facts to be executed, but it is not possible to do physics without logic.
  41. A science that wants to explain all the particular facts needs to be accompanied by a eidetic science (as general as possible), from which the principles that would allow such a degree of explanation are extracted.
  42. The degree of abstraction in a “pure science” begins small and increases over the centuries, as it did in geometry.
  43. That means that the title of “eidetic science” is acquired, not given.
  44. Subordination of the material to the formal by the formal ontology is what gives the constitution common to all “material ontologies.”
  45. Genre and species are two extremes of the same scale, in which the species is the most particular being of an extremely general genre.

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