for a Pure Phenomenology and for a Phenomenological Philosophy”
was written by Edmund Husserl. Below,
what I learned reading his text.
Natural knowledge is
Thus, natural knowledge is
limited by the world and is useful in the world, which is the field
Natural knowledge, if it is
experimental, is sensitive and present: it is not about
anticipations or about memories, nor about what we do not feel in
ourselves, but about here and now, or what could be here and now.
It is possible to observe what
is experienced by others, but only in a metaphorical sense: it is
not that we observe what they feel, but we observe how they
externalize their feelings, since we can observe their actions.
Figuring out a person’s
feelings by observing their actions isn’t an “originally given”
knowledge, because you are speculating about their feelings by
observing something that isn’t the feeling itself.
The world as object of study is
the stage of all the phenomena that can be theorized about.
This world as an object of study
is what the natural sciences are concerned with.
This is not to say that the
humanities shouldn’t be concerned with this world.
Empirical science studies the
Fact = here and now.
If something happened before,
but doesn’t happen now, it was a fact and it can still be studied.
It is through the study of facts
and their relationships that we can create “laws” that
That’s because facts tend to
repeat themselves, given a set of conditions that could originate
fact has essential (primary) and secondary predicates.
What is common in all sounds is
the essence of sound, but other characteristics that may exist with
the sound are ” accidental
It is through these
characteristics that we categorize the facts.
The essence is that
characteristic that makes something cease to belong in a certain
concept if such characteristic is removed: sound if vibration of
air, só, if there’s no air, there’s no sound, which makes air
essential to the sound.
Ideation (“visualization” of
essence) is not an empirical activity.
Pure essence is not concrete,
but it is related to the concrete.
Empirical study looks at one
side of the thing at a time.
There is always something in the
object of study that escapes us.
something is logical, that is, if a concept contains possible
characteristics in itself, it is something that can be studied and
perhaps we will find it in the real world someday.
The fact that something is
visible does not guarantee that we can understand it.
Personal intuition without
ideation is not possible.
It is possible to “extract”
the essence of something without the concrete fact (here and now),
by bringing the memory of the fact
to mind and reasoning about it in a mental experiment.
Then it is possible to reason
about something that was not experienced by the person who is
of the facts requires empirical
Reasoning about essences
requires apprehension of the essence.
When you work with pure
geometry, you do not think about that cone, about that circle or
that cube, but about the general rules about the cone, circle, or
cube, which cover cones, circles, and cubes in general.
Eidetic generality is like pure
geometry: it is generality unconditioned to particular things (kinda
like an axiom, but not exactly an axiom).
An eidetic generality can be
applied to concrete cases (as laws of nature can be applied to
Eidetic generality is not
exactly like natural laws, because natural laws always presuppose
the existence of something, whereas eidetic generality does not
necessarily suppose that the object to which the concept refers
actually exists (it’s “theorized” about).
Each essence has a number of
possible factual singularizations (a concept may or may not
correspond to reality, sometimes in more than one form), so that
there is co-operation between science of facts (practical,
empirical) and science of essences (theoretical, conceptual).
Examples of science of essences
are pure mathematics, pure logic, among other abstract sciences
whose objects may or may not factually exist
(remembering that fact is here and now).
The science of the essence can
work without concrete object, but the sciences of fact (the natural
ones) can not work without concrete object.
Thus, science of fact and
experimental science are equivalent terms.
The first science of essence was
Thus it can be said that
empirical science does not contribute to the science of essence,
because factual science is only concerned with facts, and the
science of essence, as something conceptual, is indifferent to
On the other hand, empirical
science depends on concepts (“pure
For example: formal logic is
eidetic and does not need facts to be executed, but it is not
possible to do physics without logic.
A science that wants to explain
all the particular facts needs to be accompanied by a eidetic
science (as general as possible), from which the principles that
would allow such a degree of explanation are extracted.
The degree of abstraction in a
“pure science” begins small and increases over the centuries, as
it did in geometry.
That means that the title of
“eidetic science” is acquired, not given.
Subordination of the material to
the formal by the formal ontology is what gives the constitution
common to all “material ontologies.”
Genre and species are two
extremes of the same scale, in which the species is the most
particular being of an extremely general genre.